The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory

Abstract:

We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given. Equilibrium effects account for the interdependency of these decisions. This interdependency is important since, in the case of legal uncertainty, higher fines may reduce the willingness to punish, which in turn reduces the deterrence effect of high fines. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify these effects empirically by means of a strategy-method design in which potential violators can condition their behavior on the behavior of potential punishers and vice versa. All our experimental findings on both partial and equilibrium effects are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theory.

JEL classification: K12, K42, C91, D64
Keywords: Deterrence, Punishment, Uncertainty, Fines, Partial and Equilibrium Effects, Lab Experiment

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526.pdf

Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects

Abstract:

The behavioral relevance of non-binding defaults is well established. While most research has focused on decision makers’ responses to a given default, we argue that this individual decision making perspective is incomplete. Instead, a comprehensive understanding of default effects requires to take account of the strategic interaction between default setters and decision makers. We analyze theoretically and empirically which defaults emerge in such interactions, and under which conditions defaults are behaviorally most relevant. Our analysis demonstrates that the alignment of interests between default setters and decision makers, as well as their relative level of information are key drivers of default effects. In particular, default effects are more pronounced if the interests of the default setter and decision makers are more closely aligned. Moreover, decision makers are more likely to follow default options the less they are privately informed about the relevant decision environment.

JEL classification: D03, D18, D83, C92
Keywords: Default Options, Behavioral Economics, Strategic Communication, Laboratory Experiment

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516SFB.pdf

Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Abstract:

We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to the primary donation decision, namely, how much to contribute to the charitable cause. The second relates to an "add-on" decision of how much to contribute to supporting the online platform itself. We find a strong impact of defaults on individual behavior: in each of our treatments, the modal positive contributions in both choice dimensions invariably correspond to the specified default amounts. Defaults, nevertheless, have no impact on aggregate donations. This is because defaults in the donation domain induce some people to donate more and others to donate less than they otherwise would have. In contrast, higher defaults in the secondary choice dimension unambiguously induce higher contributions to the online platform.

JEL classification: C93, D03, D64
Keywords: Default Options, Online Platforms, Charitable Giving, Field Experiment

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515SFB.pdf

How Does Socio-Economic Status Shape a Child's Personality?

Abstract:

We show that socio-economic status (SES) is a powerful predictor of many facets of a child's personality. The facets of personality we investigate encompass time preferences, risk preferences, and altruism, as well as crystallized and fluid IQ. We measure a family's SES by the mother's and father's average years of education and household income. Our results show that children from families with higher SES are more patient, tend to be more altruistic and less likely to be risk seeking, and score higher on IQ tests. We also discuss potential pathways through which SES could affect the formation of a child's personality by documenting that many dimensions of a child's environment differ systematically by SES: parenting style, quantity and quality of time parents spend with their children, the mother's IQ and economic preferences, a child's initial conditions at birth, and family structure. Finally, we use panel data to show that the relationship between SES and personality is fairly stable over time at age 7 to 10. Personality profiles that vary systematically with SES might offer an explanation for social immobility.

Keywords: personality, human capital, risk preferences, time preferences, altruism, experiments with children, origins of preferences, social immobility, socio-economic status.

JEL Classification: C90, D64, D90, D81, J13, J24, J62.

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498.pdf

Identity changes and the efficiency of reputation systems

Abstract:

Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency of reputation systems. We compare two markets in which we exogenously vary whether sellers can erase their rating profile and start over as new sellers. Buyer trust and seller trustworthiness decrease significantly when sellers can erase their ratings. With identity changes, trust is particularly low towards new sellers since buyers cannot discriminate between truly new sellers and opportunistic sellers who changed their identity. Nevertheless, we observe positive returns on buyer investment under the reputation system with identity changes, and our evidence suggests that trustworthiness is higher than in the complete absence of a reputation system.

Keywords: trust; reputation; identity changes

JEL classification: C91, D02, L14

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465.pdf

Nominal or Real? The Impact of Regional Price Levels on Satisfaction with Life

Abstract:

According to economic theory, real income, i.e., nominal income adjusted for purchasing power, should be the relevant source of life satisfaction. Previous work, however, has only studied the impact of inflation adjusted nominal income and not taken into account regional differences in purchasing power. Therefore, we use a novel data set to study how regional price levels affect satisfaction with life. The data set comprises about 7 million data points that are used to construct a price level for each of the 428 administrative districts in Germany. We estimate pooled OLS and ordered probit models that include a comprehensive set of individual level, time-varying and time-invariant control variables as well as control variables that capture district heterogeneity other than the price level. Our results show that higher price levels significantly reduce life satisfaction. Furthermore, we find that a higher price level tends to induce a larger loss in life satisfaction than a corresponding decrease in nominal income. A formal test of neutrality of money, however, does not reject neutrality of money. Our results provide an argument in favor of regional indexation of government transfer payments such as social welfare benefits.

Keywords: Life satisfaction, price index, neutrality of money

JEL-Codes: D60, C23, D31

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450.pdf

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

Abstract:

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market  outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.

Keywords: incomplete contracts, bonus pay, efficiency wages, employment protection, firing costs, experiment

JEL Classification:  J41, J3, C9, D01

May 2011

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361.pdf

Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting - Productivity, Preferences and Gender

Abstract:

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tournament, and revenue sharing) compared to the fixed payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition personal attitudes such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender affect the sorting decision in a systematic way. Moreover, self-reported effort is significantly higher in all variable  pay conditions than in the fixed wage condition. Our lab findings are supported by an additional analysis using data from a large and representative sample. In sum, our findings underline the importance of multi-dimensional sorting, i.e., the tendency for different incentive schemes to systematically attract people with different individual characteristics.

Keywords: Sorting, Incentives, Piece Rates, Tournament, Revenue-Sharing, Risk Preferences, Social Preferences, Gender, Experiment, Field Evidence

JEL Classification: J3, M52, C91, D81, J16

May 2011

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360_01.pdf

Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device

Abstract:

When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.

Keywords: Relational Contracts, Involuntary Unemployment

JEL Classification: D82, J3, J41, E24, C9

May 2011

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359.pdf

Reference Points and Effort Provision

Abstract:

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.

Keywords: Reference Points, Expectations, Loss Aversion, Disappointment, Experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D01, D84, J22

May 2011

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358.pdf

Infinitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers

Abstract:

In this paper, we study infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.

July 2010

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332.pdf

Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments

Abstract:

We study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect information, where each period consists of two stages: one in which the parties simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. We first derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. Afterwards, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.

Keywords: renegotiation, infinitely repeated games, side payments, optimal penal codes

JEL Classification: C73, L14

April 2009

Full text in pdf format:

259.pdf